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Before dealing with the Brady proposals specifically,
let me say that the commercial banks in addition to
generating ideas themselves have been, and remain.
receptive to new ideas on how the debt of rescheduling
LDCs should be managed.
That is not to say that we will not appraise each idea in
a professionally critical fashion. Neither do we feel
obliged to accept those ideas merely because we have
no similarly structured alternative plan. When we first
saw Secretary Brady's ideas in print we felt that they
should be given a fair consideration. They have
received such consideration and, not to put too fine a
point upon it, have been found wanting.
The Problems with Brady
We have five major points of issue with the Brady
Plan:
The significance of the relief ultimately accorded to
the LDCs and HIMCs needs to be questioned
seriously.
There is a high risk of sending the wrong signals to
the borrowers - good and bad alike.
It requires only one credit group, the commercial
banks, to take a hit.
It is based upon a major misconception regarding
the banks' role as providers of medium and long term
finance for LDCs and HIMCs.
y) It seriously understates the degree of public sector
responsibility by largely ignoring the part played by
government policies in exacerbating the debt crisis.
Before dealing with each point separately, I would
make the 'umbrella' point that all these factors coming
together as they do under Brady produces a most
unsatisfactory result, in that it raises expectations in
debtor countries to unrealistic levels that will be
difficult to meet. Furthermore, it threatens to divert
attention away from what we consider to be the most
important ingredient of the process and that is the
reform efforts and structural adjustment in the
indebted countries themselves.
To take each point in turn:
i) Significance of Relief
There must be considerable doubt whether indebted
countries' expectations in terms of the quantum of
/1)2, /0,/ls/Lo, 99/), o) 2) r,,s 2. ls/sto/sso I 1)csssloptosst,t 0/odio.. Sosso s
50
relief they will receive by way of the Brady proposals
can in fact be fulfilled. My economist colleagues have
undertaken a study which shows that for the four
major Latin American debtors, Argentina, Brazil,
Mexico and Venezuela, savings in cash flow terms over
the period 1990-92 are likely to total some US$12 bn or
just over 17 per cent. For the purpose of their studies,
relief was front loaded but the final picture could
emerge somewhat worse, as no account was taken of
any increase in interest payments to the World Bank
or IMF on the funds used in debt or debt service
reduction schemes.
This leads to the somewhat anachronistic feature of
the Brady plan, new money is to be coupled with debt
relief. It makes no commercial sense for a banker to
incur losses through debt and debt service reduction
on the one hand and provide new money (which may
feed through with further buy back schemes, bearing
in mind the fungibility of money) on the other.
It is at this point that we should also explode the myth
of returning flight capital. Although claims have been
made that flight capital is returning to Mexico, I do
not know how this is being measured as its departure
in the first place can at best only be 'guesstimated'.
Flight capital only returns once a track record of
stable economic management has been established.
Frankly this will take years.
The 'Wrong Signals' Risk
There is a significant risk that countries benefiting
from debt and debt service reduction may interpret
this as the first step along a road leading to a more
generalised form of debt forgiveness. (Banks are into
debt for equity, debt for goods but most emphatically
not debt forgiveness).
There is a risk also in respect of those countries that
have fulfilled their payment obligations, often at
considerable cost. Where is the incentive for them, the
virtuous, to continue making such payments? This is
coupled with a matching risk that banks, as a result of
their debt and debt service reduction experiences, will
be less inclined to support even those LDCs whose
loans are still performing, thus precipitating further
rescheduling requests.
One Creditor Group Participation
It is apparently only the commercial banks who are to
be considered as contributors by way of debt and debt
service reduction. There is a general assumption that
all official sector exposure is maintained at its full face
value. But, apart from the question of public sector
responsibility, the issue of debt relief is too large for it
to be borne solely by one creditor group. The
multilaterals and governments have preached con-
tinuously over a number of years to the commercial
banks about burden sharing. They too should be
prepared to practice what they preach.
iv) The Misconception of Banks' Roles in Financing
LDCs
The official sector has failed to recognise that the
withdrawal of the banks from this type of financing,
far from being an aberration, is a return to the
traditional style of relationship between countries and
the commercial banking community. This is one based
primarily on the financing of trade.
The explosive growth in medium term bank exposures
to LDCs resulted from two oil price shocks. The
official sector was more than happy to stand by and
watch the banks recycle oil surpluses. Economist
colleagues tell me that from 1966-69, on average, bank
lending accounted for 13 per cent of the major Latin
American borrowers' debt. This expanded to 44 per
cent in the 1974-77 period and leapt further to 55.6 per
cent in 1978-81, just prior to the crisis breaking. It
peaked at just over 63 per cent in 1984 after we put in
all that new money, a fact often conveniently
overlooked in the US Treasury, and since then it has
fallen below 60 per cent. In my view, this figure will
continue to fall as banks restrict themselves to
financing short term trade and limit medium term
exposure to projects likely to generate hard currency
to meet servicing costs and ultimate repayment.
y) Public Sector Responsibility
The economic environment facing the LDCs was not
of the commercial banks' making. The greatest
influence arose from policy decisions made primarily
within the OECD. Creditor country governments
actively encouraged the recycling by commercial
banks of petro dollar surpluses, not once but twice.
Floating rate debt, sustainable in the 1970s, became
increasingly expensive for the LDC borrowers in the
1980s. The rise in interest rates was part of a policy
framework in industrial countries, the US in
particular, designed to combat the inflationary impact
of the second oil price shock primarily through a
tightening in monetary policies. It is arguable that the
increase in interest rates went well beyond levels we
could reasonably have anticipated when the funds
were originally lent. Indeed, the high real rates have
not proved a temporary phenomenon and, whilst
precise linkages may be difficult to prove, I believe
that strong connections exist between the high interest
rates and dollar volatility of recent years and
structural imbalances in the OECD, most notably the
twin US deficits.
Leading on from there, surging nominal and real
interest rates in the early 1980s were major
contributing factors to the downturn in OECD
economic activity. One estimate calculates the impact
on non-oil LDCs of global recession and higher
interest rates in 1981-82 as exceeding $140 bn.
Recession fuelled the fires of protectionism, and there
is no doubt that its growth in industrial countries has
made it even more difficult for LDCs to achieve the
level of export growth needed to meet the debt service
bill. Protectionist pressures have not abated and
according to estimates made by the World Bank, such
pressures will have cost LDCs at least $60 bn in 1989,
almost 2/rds of their projected interest bill of $100 bn.
In the face of such evidence, it is hard to see how the
commercial banks can accept the burden alone and a
positive outcome still be anticipated.
Where Next?
The limited ability and willingness of the commercial
banks to extend new finance to the LDCs should be
quite clear by now. We do not question the desirability
of foreign policy goals such as the spreading and
strengthening of democracy, but it must be accepted
that banks are commercial institutions and our
operations must reflect our primary obligations to
depositors and shareholders. Writing off debt
concurrently with lending new money makes no
commercial sense whatever.
Accepting that the banks will return to their more
traditional roles of trade and project financing, this
leaves the long term financing gap to be filled. The
return to private direct investment offers, in my view,
the greatest potential for channelling resources to the
LDCs. These flows however, will only arise once the
adjustment process is well bedded in and consistent
economic performance established. In the meantime,
the official sector will have to assume the burden if
only for the reason that the twin problems of debt and
development are too important to be left entirely to
bilateral negotiations between commercial bank
creditors and debtor countries.
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